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THE TREATY-MAKING POWER-A REAL
AND PRESENT DANGER
HONORABLE ORIE L. PHILLIPS,
United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

At the outset, I want to make it perfectly clear that this is
not an attack upon the United Nations with respect to its primary
function of preventing aggression and maintaining peace and order
in the world. With respect to those functions, I have ardently
supported the organization, both in public addresses and in written articles.
It may be well to preface this discussion with certain fundamental concepts with respect to which I think we may be in substantial agreement.
Our Federal government is, and should continue to be, one
of delegated and limited powers. Its powers should be limited to
matters that are national in scope and character and matters which
are essentially local in character should be reserved to the states
and the people, with the power to deal with them in the light of
peculiar local conditions and problems which differ widely throughout the various sections of our great country.
In a country as vast as ours, with varying local conditions and
problems, the expansion of Federal power with respect to matters
not national in scope and character means inefficiency in administration, extravagance in expenditures of public funds, and an
expansion of bureaucracy with its tendency to become a rule of
men rather than of law, to promulgate a maze of rules and regulations, without regard, and in many instances, unsuited to local
conditions and problems, and to become arbitrary and tyrannical
in the administration and in the enforcement of such rules and
regulations.
Because of these things, it is my firm conviction that the
preservation of the rights and powers of the states and the principles of local self-government is essential to the maintenance of
liberty and the fundamental freedoms of the individual.
Perhaps the question arises in your mind, why does the
treaty-making power under provisions of our Federal Constitution, which have not been changed since its adoption, now give
rise to questions of supreme importance. There are three reasons:
(1) In what is otherwise a government of limited and delegated powers under the Constitution, no express limitation exists
on the treaty power, and the existence of any implied limitations
is shrouded in doubt; (2) A basic change of viewpoint is being
carried into effect with respect to the functions and purpose of
treaties. A veritable avalanche of new treaties is under consideration by the United Nations and its affiliated organizations in the
social, economic, cultural, civil and political fields. It is reliably
reported that they have 200 treaties "in the works";' and (3) PerJessup, .A Moder
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sistent efforts have been made during the past two decades to find
additional constitutional basis for expansion of the powers of the
Federal government, and the treaty power has been seized upon
as a conveniently available vehicle for such expansion.
The issue presented is whether a constitutional amendment
limiting the treaty-making power is necessary to preserve the reserved powers of the states and the principle of local self government and to safeguard the rights and liberties of our people.
Until recently it was a fundamental concept of international
law that it is a law between states and not between individuals or
between individuals and states.
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations
and depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the honor
of the governments which are parties to it. If dishonored, its
infraction becomes the subject of international reclamation and
negotiation. At the time the Constitution was adopted and until
recently, treaties entered into by the United States generally
were compacts in that primary sense, imposing duties and obligations on the contracting states and not on individual citizens. True,
under the supreme law provision of our Constitution, a self-executing treaty becomes municipal law in the United States and such
a treaty may confer rights upon citizens or subjects of a signatory
nation, residing in the United States, which partake of the nature
of municipal law and which are capable of enforcement as between
private parties in the courts. An illustration is found in treaties
which regulate the mutual rights of the citizens and subjects of
the contracting parties with respect
to the devolution of property
2
to aliens by devise or inheritance.
Mr. Hamilton in The Federalist,No. 75, referring to the treaty
power, said:
It relates neither to the execution of the subsisting
laws, nor to the enaction of new ones; and still less to an
exertion of the common strength. Its objects are contracts with foreign nations, which have the force of law,
but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are
not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but
agreements between sovereign and sovereign.
Mr. Jefferson, in his Manual of ParliamentaryPractice, had
this to say:
By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution must have intended to comprehend only those objects
which are usually regulated by treaties, and cannot be
otherwise regulated.
It must have meant to except out all those rights
reserved to the states; for surely the President and the
Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole government is
interdicted from doing in any way.
But that view ceased to prevail with the decision of the Su2 Head

Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598.
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preme Court in Missouri v. Holland,3 as I shall presently show.
Today, however, treaties are being proposed, and at least one
has been submitted to the Senate for ratification, which impose
civil and criminal liability for acts of citizens of the United States
or which affect rights of and impose duties and obligations on
citizens of the United States,
in areas heretofore within the re4
served powers of the states.
This brings me to a consideration of the provisions of our
Federal Constitution with respect to the treaty-making power.
Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 2, of the United States Constitution provides:
He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. * * *
It will be observed that the grant of power is general and
the limitation is only on the manner of its exercise.
5
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation,
decided in
1936, the court held that the treaty-making power is not one
granted by the states; that it does not depend upon an affirmative
grant in the Constitution; that without such a grant it would have
vested in the Federal government as necessary concomitants of
nationality; and that the United States is vested with all the powers of government necessary to maintain an effective control of
international relations.
In United States v. Belmont," decided in 1937, the court said:
The external powers of the United States to be
exercised without regard to state laws or policies.
And in United States v. Pink,7 decided in 1942, the court said:
The field which affects international relations is 'the
one aspect of our government that from the first has been
most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad
national authority.'
Dicta may be found in decisions of the Supreme Court to the
effect that while the treaty-making power is not limited by any
express provision in the Constitution, it does not authorize what
the Constitution forbids and its exercise must not be inconsistent
with the nature of our government and the relation between the
states and the United States. 8 But, to this good day, no treaty has
been judicially declared to be beyond the treaty-making power of
the national government.
May I now direct your attention to Article VI, Paragraph 2,
of the United States Constitution, which provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
3252 U.S. 416, 432, 433.
4

Allen, The Treaty as an Instrument of Legislation, pp. 10, 11.

- 299 U.S.
8 301 U.S.
' 315 U.S.
'Asakura

304, 315-318.
324, 331.
203, 232.
v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 341;

Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211; 243;

Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267.
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which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties, made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.
It will be observed that under this provision, laws of the
United States are the supreme law of the land only if made in
pursuance of the Constitution while treaties are declared to be
the supreme law of the land if they are made under the authority
of the United States.
The last paragraph of Section 8 of Article I of the COnstitution grants to Congress the power to make all laws necessary and
proper for carrying into execution its enumerated powers and
"all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
Under that provision, the Congress may enact laws to implement
and carry into effect a treaty made under the authority of the
United States, although it would not have power under the Constitution to enact such laws in the absence of the treaty. Such
was the holding of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland,"
where the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918,10 and the
regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture in pursuance
thereof came before the Supreme Court. In its opinion the court
referred to two prior cases holding that an earlier act of Congress
which attempted by itself, and not in pursuance of a treaty, to
regulate the killing of migratory birds within the states was invalid, and stated:
Whether the two cases cited were decided rightly or
not they cannot be accepted as a test of the treaty power.
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only
when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority
of the United States. . . . There may be matters of the
sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act
of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed
by such an act could ...
The validity of the Congressional enactment implementing the
treaty was upheld.
In an address before the American Society of International
Law, on April 26, 1929, the late Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes said:
If we take the Constitution to mean what it says, it
gives in terms to the United States the power to make
treaties. It is a power that has no explicit limitation
attached to it, and so far there has been no disposition
to find in anything relating to the external concerns of
the nation a limitation to be implied.
" Sqpra.
1040

Stat. 755.
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Now there is, however, a new line of activity which
has not been very noticeable in this country, but which
may be in the future, and this may give rise to new questions as to the extent of the treaty-making power.
This is a sovereign nation; from my point of view
the nation has the power to make any agreement whatever in a constitutional manner that relates to the conduct
of our international relations, unless there can be found
some express prohibition in the Constitution, and I am
not aware of any which would in any way detract from
the power as I have defined it in connection with our
relations with other governments. But if we attempted
to use the treaty-making power to deal with matters
which did not pertain to our external relations but to control matters which normally and appropriately were
within the local jurisdictions of the States, then I again
say there might be ground for implying a limitation upon
the treaty-making power that it is intended for the purpose of having treaties made relating to foreign affairs
and not to make laws for the people of the United States
in their internal concerns through the exercise of the
asserted treaty-making power.
But, the present State Department takes a position contrary
to the implied limitation suggested by the late Chief Justice. In
a statement released by the State Department, in September, 1950,
it said:
There is no longer any real distinction between
"domestic" and "foreign" affairs."
The growing tendency to undertake to create a basis for Congressional enactments under the treaty-making power, not within
the Constitutional grant of legislative power in the absence of a
treaty, is indicated by the report of the President's Committee
on Civil Rights, from which I quote:
"The Human Rights Commission of the United Nations at present is working on a detailed international
bill of rights designed to give more specific meaning to
the general principles announced in Article 55 of the
Charter: if this document is accepted by the United
States as a member state, an even stronger base for congressional action under the treaty power may be established." Report of Civil Rights Committee, Par. 10.
If the treaty-making power is not subject to the implied limitation suggested by Chief Justice Hughes, a treaty, in addition to
creating broad power to enact implementing legislation by Congress, may perforce of the treaty itself, if self-executing by its
terms, have the force and effect of a legislative enactment affecting matters of local concern and traditionally regarded as within
the reserved powers of the states. A self-executing treaty, in addi, State Department Publication 3972, Foreign Affairs Policy Series 26.
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tion to being an international contract, becomes municipal, viz.
local, law of the United States in each of the several states and
the judges of each state are bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of their state to the contrary notwithstanding. Only in the United States, and to a limited degree in France,
does a self-executing treaty become municipal law without enabling legislation. Any other nation which enters into a treaty
becomes bound thereby under international law, but the treaty
does not become internal law in such nation, imposing duties or
obligations upon its citizens, unless it is implemented by legislation
enacted in accordance with its constitutional processes.
May I refer briefly to some of the proposed treaties which,
if entered into, will affect individual rights and freedoms of our
citizens or impose civil and criminal liability on individuals.
Today, affiliated agencies of the United Nations have under consideration in excess of 150 proposed treaties dealing with a multitude of subjects, most of which have heretofore been regarded as
within the reserve powers of the states. At least seventeen of
such treaties are in the drafting stage-not by the Secretary of
State, but by such affiliated agencies. Time will not permit a
detailed discussion of many of these treaties. One is the proposed
Convention on Gathering and International Transmission of News
and Right of Correction. Mr. Carroll Binder, a Minneapolis newspaper man, says:
There is no possibility of substantially increasing
freedom of information through the United Nations under
present conditions. On the contrary, there is danger that
encroachment upon freedom of information now practiced by individual sovereign states may obtain legal or
moral sanction through United Nations instruments or
declarations.
Another is the proposed Covenant on Human Rights. Article
2 of that Covenant provides that "in the case of a state of emergency officially proclaimed by the authorities, a state may take
measures derogating from its obligations" to preserve freedom of
speech and of press, and Paragraph 3, Article 14, of that Covenant
provides:
The right to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas carries with it special duties and responsibilities
and may therefore be subject to certain penalties, liabilities, and restrictions, but these shall be such only as are
provided by law and are necessary for the protection of
national security, public order, safety, health or morals,
or of the rights, freedoms or reputations of others.
Like provisions are embraced in the news-gathering convention.
It is obvious that the Oatis case and similar prosecutions
would be legalized under a claim of national defense, national
v. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10;
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 10, 194.
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security, public order, or emergency, and under it the United States
could legalize peacetime censorship. He who writes the orders
for national defense, national security, public order, or national
emergency may control much of the thought of this and other
countries.
In an article published in the January, 1948, issue of the
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,
Mr. John P. Humphrey, a Canadian, and the Director of the Division of Human Rights of the United Nations, said:
What the United Nations is trying to do is revolutionary in character. Human rights are largely a matter
of relationships between the state and individuals, and
therefore a matter which has been traditionally regarded
as being within the domestic jurisdiction of states. What
is now being proposed is, in effect, the creation of some
kind of supernational supervision of this relationship
between the state and its citizens.
The laws of the several states require as a qualification for
admission to the bar United States citizenship. The treaty with
Israel, recently transmitted to the Senate by the President, provides that nationals of either country shall not be barred from
practicing professions in the other country by reason of their
being aliens, if they comply with other requirements, such as residence and competence. Under the most favored nation clause,
included in many treaties to which the United States is a party,
the above provision in the Israel treaty, if it goes into effect, would
be automatically applicable to the nationals of a very large number
of countries. This is a typical example of an invasion of the reserve powers of the states.
Another is the Genocide Convention now before the Senate
for ratification.
I am not unmindful that in the past, acts which this Convention undertakes to define as international crimes have been perpetrated against human groups which shocked the conscience of
mankind, were contrary to moral law, and were abhorrent to all
persons who have a proper and decent regard for the dignity of
human beings, regardless of the national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups to which they belong, and that the end sought to be
attained by this Convention is wholly desirable. But the definitions of Genocide in the Convention are vague and lacking in precision. They do not lay down a certain and understandable rule of
conduct. A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as1 3to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law.
Moreover, the Genocide Convention proposes ultimately to vest
in an international criminial tribunal jurisdiction to try, convict,
and sentence American citizens charged with the offense of Geno"' Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391.
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cide, without the safeguards which our Federal and State Constitutions guarantee to persons charged with domestic crimes.
A separate ad hoc United Nations committee of seventeen
members was created by the General Assembly on December 12,
1950, to prepare a preliminary draft Convention for the establishment of an international criminal court. A draft statute was
completed in August, 1951. It is significant that this statute expressly deprives a defendant of the right to be tried by a jury of
his peers in the district in which the offense is charged to have
been committed-a right we regard as fundamental, and affords
no protection against the use of an involuntary confession as evidence against the accused, a device almost universally resorted to
in the trial of persons accused of crime in the police states. Indeed,
it is asserted in the Report of the Section of International and
Comparative Law to the House of Delegates, Mid-Winter Meeting,
February 25-26, 1952, that a United States citizen, although
charged with an offense committed in the United States, if brought
to trial by an international criminal court for an offense against
international law, would not be entitled to the safeguards guaranteed by our Federal Constitution to persons charged with offenses
against the United States, on the theory that such Constitutional
safeguards have application only to domestic offenses and trials in
our own domestic courts. I vigorously disagree with that concept,
but it shows the extent to which this new notion with respect to
the treaty-making power is being pressed.
What is the answer to our problem? Fbr more than two years
the committee of the American Bar Association on Peace and
Law Through United Nations, a committee on which I have been
privileged to serve since its creation, has engaged in a study of
this problem. At the Mid-Winter Meeting of the American Bar
Association, in 1952, the committee reported to the House of Delegates a proposed Constitutional amendment, which the House
adopted on February 26 last. The amendment reads:
A provision of a treaty which conflicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or
effect. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in
the United States only through legislation by Congress
which it could enact under its delegated powers in the
absence of such treaty.
If adopted, the amendment will prevent a treaty from becoming internal law in the United States by force of its self-executing
terms. It will modify the holding of Missouri v. Holland, supra,
and restrict the power of Congress in enacting legislation to implement a treaty to the legislative powers that it would have in
the absence of such treaty, and will negative the inherent power
theory laid down by the bioad language of United States v. CurtissWright Corporation,supra.
It should be noted particularly that the American Bar Association's proposed amendment does not prevent the President and the
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Senate from making a treaty, otherwise valid under the Constitution, on any subject whatsoever, and renders all such treaties
effective externally. But the proposal prevents such a treaty from
becoming effective as internal law in the United States, except to
the extent that Congress legislates within its delegated powers in
the absence of such treaty.
It has been asserted that the proposed amendment would unreasonably limit the power of the Federal government in the international field. I disagree. Under its power to make war, Congress can conclude peace and it customarily does so by joint resolution. Under its power "to regulate commerce with foreign
nations," Congress can implement treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation-a field which embraces a large portion of
the treaties negotiated between the nations. Congress has the
power "to define and punish piracies and offenses on the high seas
and offenses against the law of nations." Under that power, Congress can implement treaties dealing with such offenses or can
define and provide for the punishment of such offenses without any
antecedent treaty. The foregoing are but illustrations, which could
be multiplied in other fields, such as extradition, judicial assistance,
and the like, and such treaties will become the supreme law of the
land to the extent they are made so by act of Congress legislating
within its delegated powers.
It has been further asserted that the treaty-making power as
it now exists is essential in a dual or Federal-State governmental
system such as ours. That argument, in my opinion, is untenable.
It may be that the proposed amendment would exclude some areas
in which treaties are now made or proposed. But that presents no
insoluble problem, as was pointed out by the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council in Canada v. Ontario (1937) Law Reports,
Appeal Cases, pp. 326, 348, 353-4, wherein it held that when a
treaty embraces provincial classes of subjects, they must be dealt
with by the totality of powers, Dominion and Provincial legislatures
together, in other words, by cooperation between the Dominion and
the several provinces. Here, the same end can be attained by cooperation between the Federal government and the states. Such a
procedure would give due recognition to the reserved powers of the
states.
It is also suggested that the treaties to which I have referred
and other like treaties will not receive approval by the Senate.
I hope that is true. But the lessons of history tell us that unlimited
power in the agents of government is dangerous and liable to be
abused.
It is my firm conviction, after careful and painstaking consideration of the problem, that only by proper restriction of the
treaty-making power, through Constitutional amendment, can we
be sure that the rights of the states and the people and the precious
liberties and fundamental freedoms of the individual citizen will be
safeguarded and preserved.

